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LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL: THE NEED FOR
AN INTERNATIONAL INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION
Christopher M Rassi*
I. INTRODUCTION
The intersection of the "Lessons from the Saddam Trial" sympo-
sium and experts meeting and the dedication of the 780 Commission Ar-
chives' clearly highlighted a lesson learned from the first Saddam Hussein
trial before the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), a lesson that will be useful for
future internationalized and hybrid tribunals. The 780 Commission was
established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 780
(1992) to investigate violations of international humanitarian law in the
former Yugoslavia and played a valuable role in the prosecutions at the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).2 Courts
that try the alleged perpetrators of the gravest atrocities known to man may
not be independently capable of meeting the necessities of post-conflict
justice. Commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, historical and truth
commissions, and other variations of international independent investiga-
tions play a crucial role in assisting the trial process and post-conflict justice
itself.
On November 5, 2006, the IHT handed down its judgment against
Saddam Hussein and his co-defendants for their involvement in the events
that occurred between 1982 and 1985 in Dujail, a town in Iraq's central
Salahaddin governorate. Located approximately sixty kilometers north of
Baghdad, Dujail is inhabited by both Sunni and Shi'a Arabs. The attack
took place as retribution for a failed assassination attempt on the former
Associate Legal Officer, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. This article is an
expanded version of comments made at the Case Western Reserve University School of
Law's "Lessons Learned from the Saddam Trial" symposium and experts meeting on Octo-
ber 6-7, 2006. The author is grateful for the invaluable assistance of Kate Gibson and Col-
leen Peppard. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not reflect the
opinions of the United Nations or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
1 Commission of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, established on
October 6, 1992 (780 Commission). See S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg.,
2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780 (Oct. 6, 1992) (requesting the Secretary-General to establish the
780 Commission).
2 Id
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president's life on July 8, 1982. 3 Saddam Hussein, three other senior former
government officials, and four lower-level Ba'ath party members were all
charged with crimes against humanity.4 The retribution included: (1) detain-
ing and torturing eight hundred men, women, and children; (2) referring 148
male detainees to trial before the Revolutionary Court, where all were sen-
tenced to death and most were executed; and (3) confiscating and destroying
land.5 The Dujail trial began on October 10, 2005.
The Dujail judgment was expected to be the first of many to be
handed down by the IHT. Yet many questions have arisen as a result of the
verdict, which sentenced Saddam Hussein to death by hanging and was af-
firmed by the IHT Appellate Chamber on December 26, 2006. Saddam
Hussein's execution on December 30, 2006 means that he will not live to
face other charges, such as those contained in the Anfal indictment. In that
case, Saddam Hussein was charged with genocide for the brutally repressive
military campaign carried out against the Kurdish population between Feb-
ruary and August of 1988, resulting in an estimated 182,000 deaths,6 and the
destruction of between two thousand and four thousand Kurdish villages
Prior to Saddam Hussein's execution, commentators were engaged in a dis-
cussion on whether the IHT would take the extraordinary step of issuing a
stay of execution,8 despite the fact that a strict reading of Iraqi criminal law
dictated that Saddam Hussein would be executed before the Anfal trial was
completed. 9 Although that discussion has ended, another important question
3 Bruce Zagaris & Chris Ronk, International Criminal Law, 40 INT'L LAW. 263, 263-64
(2006); see also Mariam Ahmedani et al., Updates from the International Criminal Courts,
HuM. RTs. BRIEF, Winter 2006, at 41, 46.
4 An English translation of the Dujail judgment is available at http://www.law.case.edu/
saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp. An English translation of the appellate judgment is available
at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/content.asp?id=88. Both are available in the appendix
section of the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 39, issues 1 & 2.
5 HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUDGING DUJAIL: THE FIRST TRIAL BEFORE THE IRAQI HIGH
TRIBUNAL 2-3 (2006), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/iraql106/iraqi 106webwcov
er.pdf.
6 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special
Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 327, 331 (2005) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Jus-
tice in Iraq]; see Anfal Overview Page, http://www.rightsmaps.com/html/anfalbeg.html
(showing the settings of the individual Anfal campaigns); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
JUDGING DUiJAIL: THE FIRST TRIAL BEFORE THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL, supra note 5, at 7.
7 Michael A. Newton, The Significance of the Anfal Campaign Indictment, in SADDAM ON
TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 220, 220-22 (Michael P.
Scharf& Gregory S. McNeal eds., 2006) [hereinafter SADDAM ON TRIAL].
8 See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Should Saddam Hussein Be Exposed to the Death Penalty?,
in SADDAM ON TRIAL, supra note 7, at 106, 107.
9 HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE FoRMER IRAQI GOvERNMENT ON TRIAL (2005), available
at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraql005/iraql005.pdf; see also Kevin Jon Heller,
Anfal Issue #2: Will Saddam Live to Hear the Verdict in the Anfal Trial? (Aug. 21, 2006),
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is raised-how will the Anfal trial continue following the death of Saddam
Hussein, and will further indictments be issued for future trials as antici-
pated?
Given that Saddam Hussein has been executed before the Anfal
trial's completion, the ability of the IHT to achieve the goals of international
criminal justice has arguably been greatly reduced. The goals of interna-
tional criminal justice are multifaceted and include the prevention of impu-
nity, providing justice for victims and victims' families, and deterrence. In
addition, the process of international criminal justice establishes a historical
record, as the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials helped to create a historical re-
cord of the Second World War, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) is creating a record of events in Rwanda in 1994, and the
ICTY for events in Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
The IHT, by contrast, is now in a difficult position, without Saddam
Hussein as a defendant and without any certainty regarding whether further
crimes will be charged. In addition, even if further trials are completed, the
fragmented approach taken by the IHT and the decision to start with the
Dujail trial might have squandered the opportunity to leave a more complete
historical record and fulfill one of the most important goals of international
criminal justice.'I It is clear that the incomplete record created by a tribunal
will not be satisfactory, "given the widespread and systematic nature of the
political violence committed by Saddam Hussein and his repressive Ba'ath
regime for some thirty-five years,"'" which will be discussed in Part I be-
low. Despite the litany of alleged crimes, the charges in the Dujail trial re-
main the only ones to be answered by Saddam Hussein. Accordingly, to
complement the work of the IHT, an objective historical record of past po-
litical violence must be established. 12 Although such an independent inves-
tigation would have been far more useful if it had occurred prior to the
commencement of trials, as did the 780 Commission, the fact that the IHT
has already rendered its first judgment does not negate the clear need for a
thorough, independent investigation. This mechanism could be an Iraqi-led
process that would ideally enjoy national and international legitimacy and
that would also have broad Iraqi popular support. One solution is an interna-
tional independent investigation, which would help remedy the shortcom-
ings of a tribunal that is focused only on a few members of a defeated re-
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/entry.asp?entry_id=162; see also Kevin Jon Heller,
Comparing the Trial to International Standards of Due Process, in SADDAM ON TRIAL, supra
note 7, at 155, 161.
10 See Mark A. Drumbl, Looking Beyond Due Process, in SADDAM ON TRIAL, supra note 7,
at 169, 170.
" Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq, supra note 6, at 334.
12 Id. at 336.
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gime.' 3 Expanding the scope of an investigation to cover all crimes regard-
less of whether they will be prosecuted by the IHT can ensure that the vic-
tims in Iraq feel that the proceedings are meaningful to them.
Despite the rendering of the Dujail judgment and the execution of
the most notorious of the accused before the IHT, this article argues that
that an independent investigation should be established in Iraq. Part I pro-
vides an overview of some of the crimes committed by the Ba'ath regime
between 1968 and 2003. Part II examines the concept of an international
independent investigation and explains how, for example, the 780 Commis-
sion in the former Yugoslavia established a larger picture of the atrocities
committed there. Part III offers a theoretical perspective on the ability of
international independent investigations-in the form of commissions of
inquiry, fact-finding missions, and even truth commissions-to serve as a
complement and a precursor to judicial actions. Part IV examines modem
uses of international independent investigations, their successes and fail-
ures, and their role in furthering post-conflict justice. Finally, Part V exam-
ines the merits of an international independent investigation for Iraq to
complement the IHT.
II. CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE SADDAM HUSSEIN REGIME AND THE
COMPETENCE OF THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL
As the only official institution, either domestic or international,
charged with prosecuting and documenting the crimes of the Ba'ath regime,
the IHT faces an immense challenge. The IHT was created to conduct mul-
tiple trials to prosecute alleged counts of genocide and crimes against hu-
manity that occurred during Saddam Hussein's regime. Other than Dujail
and Anfal, members of the Ba'ath regime and Saddam Hussein should ar-
guably have been tried for many other crimes. The figures on casualties in
Iraq during the Saddam Hussein regime are just estimates, and as one noted
scholar in the field has signaled, no international or national investigation
has ever documented the summary executions and disappearances alleged to
have been carried out by this regime.'
4
First, among those crimes are the violent campaigns against sec-
tions of the Iraqi population, such as the 1983 campaign against members
of the Kurdish Barzani tribe for helping Iran launch an offensive, kill-
ing an estimated eight thousand Kurds, 5 the chemical gas attack on the
Halabja in March 1988, killing thousands of civilians; 16 and the forceful
"1' d. at 337.
14 Id. at331.
is See id.; CHARLES TRIPP, A HISTORY OF IRAQ 243 (2000).
16 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IRAQI KURDISTAN: THE
DESTRUCTION OF KOREME DURING THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN (1993), available at
[Vol. 39:215
LESSONS LEARNED
removal of between one hundred thousand and one hundred and ninety
thousand Shi'a Arabs from the Marshland region on the Iranian border 17 and
of Kurds in the Kirkak region.'8 At the time of the invasion of Iraq by the
coalition forces in March 2003, the Ba'ath regime was estimated to have
killed more than five hundred thousand Iraqi citizens between 1968 and
2003.'9
Second, the Ba'ath regime's two aggressive wars, the Iraq-Iran War
(1980-1988) and the Gulf War (1990-1991), led to the death of more than
one million Iraqis according to estimates.2 0 Both the Iran-Iraq war and
Iraq's occupation of Kuwait were characterized by war crimes and crimes
against humanity, and accordingly these two states had an interest in Sad-
dam Hussein's prosecution by the IHT. 2' No international consensus yet
exists regarding the characterization of aggression as an international
crime.22 Although aggression is not included as an international crime under
the WIT statute, aggressive conduct against Arab countries is characterized
23
as a domestic crime. As such, Saddam Hussein's regime should be called
to account for these actions.
Third, UN sanctions imposed against the Ba'ath Regime24 caused
the deaths of an estimated 576,000 children and older persons between the
http://hrw.org/reports/1992/iraqkor/; HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KuRDs (2003), available at http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/
ANFAL1NT.htm.
17 Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, The Iraqi Government Assault on the Marsh
Arabs (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/marsharabs1 .pdf.
18 Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq, supra note 6, at 331.
"9 Id. at 330.
20 Id. at 332.
21 Christopher Greenwood, Analysis: Trying Saddam, GUARDIAN, Dec. 17, 2003,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/analysis/story/0,3604,1108532,00.html.
22 See generally William Schabas, Shouldn't Saddam Hussein Be Prosecuted for the
Crime ofAggression?, in SADDAM ON TRIAL, supra note 7, at 225, 225-26.
23 Kanoon al-moohakima al-jina'ya al-Iraqiya al-mukhtasa [The Statute of the Iraqi High
Tribunal] art. 14, Oct. 18, 2005, available at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/
documents/ISTstatuteofficial english.pdf (Iraq). The IHT has jurisdiction over crimes
committed in Iraq and abroad (e.g., in Iran or Kuwait) between 1968 and 2003 by former
regime members. The IHT's subject matter jurisdiction comprises a mix of international and
domestic law that existed prior to Saddam Hussein's ascension to power in 1968. The do-
mestic law crimes are stated in Article 14 and include "[t]he abuse of position and the pursuit
of policies that were about to lead to the threat of war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq
against an Arab country." Id.
24 See S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2929th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6,
1990). The embargo was lifted with Resolution 1483 on May 22, 2003. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N.
SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
2006-2007]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
end of the Gulf War and 1995.25 While the international community is not
blameless, Saddam Hussein's regime made decisions on the allocation of
resources that produced these results, arguably leaving it responsible for
many of the resulting deaths.26
Lastly, it has also been alleged that the Ba'ath regime squandered
Iraq's assets on the development of weapons of mass destruction, and Sad-
dam Hussein and his family embezzled public funds.27 While at this stage,
such allegedly fraudulent conduct has not yet been properly documented
and accounted for, these allegations have been exposed by the Independent
Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil for Food Program. 8
III. THE 780 COMMISSION: BENEFITS OF A PROPER INVESTIGATION
The benefits of a thorough investigative process prior to the crea-
tion of a tribunal are evidenced by the early success of the ICTY. Prior to
the 780 Commission, internationally-established, independent investigations
to document alleged war crimes and prepare for eventual prosecutions be-
fore international and national judicial bodies were rare. The first two such
independent investigations were the 1919 Commission on the Responsibili-
ties of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties for Viola-
tions of the Laws and Customs of War (1919 Commission), and the 1943
United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC).29 These independent
bodies conducted a significant number of investigations and produced a
large body of evidence and information.30 This evidence and information
25 Barbara Crossette, Iraq Sanctions Kill Children, UN. Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
1995, at A9 (reporting a figure prepared by the Food and Agriculture Organization).
26 Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq, supra note 6, at 332-33.
27 Id. at331.
28 See generally Independent Inquiry Committee Documents, http:l/www.iic-offp.org/
documents.htm (last visited May 25, 2007).
29 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 784 (1994) [hereinafter
Bassiouni, Commission of Experts]. Other than these two investigations, the Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace created a non-governmental independent investigation "to
investigate alleged atrocities committed against civilians and prisoners of war during the
Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913." Michael P. Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International
Truth Commission, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375, 377 (1997). It should be noted that the
Far Eastern Commission (FEC) was created in December 1945 and consisted of eleven
states, with the four major Allied powers having veto power. However, the FEC was not an
investigative body. M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years:
The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARv. HUM. RTS. 11,
31 (1997) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Versailles to Rwanda].
30 The 1919 Commission "completed its report in 1920 and listed 895 alleged war crimi-
nals, who were to be tried by the Allied tribunal." Bassiouni, Versailles to Rwanda, supra
note 29, at 16 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 39:215
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was intended to be used to support possible international and national
prosecutions. However, after the First World War, a tribunal was never es-
tablished.31 After the Second World War, the Nuremberg International Mili-
tary Tribunal (IMT) was created. However, again the Allies made no use of
the evidence gathered by the UNWCC in its trials.32
Since the Second World War, the independent investigation has
also been used in the human rights field, whether on the initiative of the UN
Security Council, the Secretary-General, or the UN Commission on Human
Rights.33 Since the 1960s, the UN has established independent investiga-
tions in South Africa, Chile, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Ivory
Coast, East Timor and Burundi, Haiti, Darfur, the Great Lakes Region, as
well as Yugoslavia and Rwanda, among others, although they have not all
met their goals.34
However, it was not until the 780 Commission that the international
community realized the potential of an independent investigation as a sepa-
rate mechanism of criminal justice. Unlike any previous independent inves-
tigations, the 780 Commission was the first to receive its mandate from the
Security Council. The 780 Commission was not originally mandated as the
first step in the establishment of an ad hoc war crimes tribunal. Nonetheless,
the US position, for example, contemplated the creation of such a court.35
31 Bassiouni, Commission of Experts, supra note 29, at 789 (stating that the European
Allies and the United States "did not wish to antagonize Germany and its people any fur-
ther").
32 The UNWWC was not institutionally linked to the IMT or the Subsequent Proceedings
by the Allied occupation forces in Germany pursuant to Allied Control Council Law No. 10.
However, the information that the UNWWC collected was relied upon by governments in
subsequent national prosecutions. Bassiouni, Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 29, at 21-23.
33 Philip Alston, The Darfur Commission as a Model for Future Responses to Crisis Situa-
tions, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 600, 606 (2005).
34 For a further discussion on these mechanisms, see Alston, supra note 33, at 601-02. For
example, the Security Council established a fact finding mission, a commission for the Great
Lakes region which went to the Congo, although was quickly recalled. See M. Cherif Bas-
siouni, Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 35,
44 (2001). In East Timor, no significant fact-finding report has been published despite Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1272, which established the United Nations Transitional Administra-
tion in East Timor. See id. at 45 n.18-19 (citing S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess.,
4057th mtg., 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999)). For more on the International
Commission of Inquiry on East Timor and the other mechanisms in East Timor, see gener-
ally Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and National Recon-
ciliation: The UN Truth Commission for East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 952 (2001). In Haiti,
numerous bodies were involved in the investigation and reporting of crimes. For more on the
various mechanisms in Haiti, see generally William G. O'Neill, Human Rights Monitoring
vs. Political Expediency: The Experience of the OAS/U.N. Mission in Haiti, 8 HARv. HUM.
RTs. J. 101 (1995).
35 Bassiouni, Commission of Experts, supra note 29, at 790 n.42 (1994).
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It was not until February 22, 1993, following the submission of the
780 Commission's interim report, that the Security Council moved toward
establishing the ICTY.36 In Resolution 808 (1993), the Security Council
decided that "an international criminal tribunal shall be established for the
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991.", 7 On April 30, 1994, the 780 Commission turned over its database
and all of its documents and materials to the Office of the Prosecutor of the
ICTY. The initial work of the prosecutor was partly based on those materi-
als, and the ICTY also hired personnel who had been with the 780 Commis-
sion.38 Significantly, within a few months of the rendering of the final re-
port, two dozen indictments were issued by the ICTY.39
The 780 Commission was groundbreaking in its gathering and
analysis of the facts, conducting on-site investigations, facilitating investi-
gations conducted by governments, engaging in field missions, and cooper-
ating with governments, UN bodies, intergovernmental organizations, and
nongovernmental organizations. 40 By April 1994, the documentation center
had catalogued and analyzed over sixty-four thousand documents and had
created a computerized archive of over three hundred hours of videotapes
containing testimonies of individuals and footage of the atrocities. 4' The
eighty-four-page final report contained annexes of thirty-three hundred
pages of detailed information and analysis.42 The final report developed into
36 Id. at 791.
17 S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22,
1993).
38 See Bassiouni, Commission of Experts, supra note 29, at 792.
39 Michael P. Scharf, Cherif Bassiouni and the 780 Commission: The Gateway to the Era
of Accountability, FREDERICK K. COX INT'L L. CTR., Oct. 2006, at 10-11 [hereinafter Scharf,
Bassiouni and the 780 Commission], available at http://lawwww.cwru.edu/curriculum/news/
pdfs/OccasionalPaper OfTheCoxCenter.pdf.
40 See Bassiouni, Commission of Experts, supra note 29, at 795-800.
41 Scharf, Bassiouni and the 780 Commission, supra note 39, at 15.
42 For a further discussion of the contents of the final report, see id. at 10; Bassiouni, Ap-
praising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions, supra note 34, at 46; Bassiouni, Ver-
sailles to Rwanda, supra note 29, at 39-41. See Commission of Experts, Final Report of the
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992),
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994). Over a two-year
period, the 780 Commission conducted thirty-five field missions, including mass grave ex-
humations. The 780 Commission identified over eight hundred places of detention, estimated
fifty thousand cases of torture and two hundred thousand deaths, and estimated two million
displaced persons as a result of ethnic cleansing that was documented in connection with
some two thousand towns and villages where the practices took place. The 780 Commission
conducted the first and most extensive investigation into systematic rape, which produced
over five hundred affidavits of victims who identified their perpetrators. Interviews were
conducted with 223 victims and witnesses; information led to the identification of close to
[Vol. 39:215
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a documentary record of the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia,
and became the memorial for the hundreds of thousands of victims. Thus,
the 780 Commission established a larger picture of atrocities, as opposed to
detailing only the individual criminal liability of those being prosecuted.
WV. PURPOSE OF INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIONS
Independent investigations, being separate mechanisms of interna-
tional criminal justice, serve five primary purposes. They can, in this re-
spect, serve as both a complement and a precursor to judicial actions.43
First, independent investigations can establish a more complete his-
torical record of the events that occurred. By establishing a credible account
of the crimes committed, the resulting report and investigations prevent
"history from being lost or re-written, and allows a society to learn from its
past in order to prevent a repetition of such violence in the future."
44
Second, independent investigations play a role in ensuring justice
for victims. The investigations and findings promote justice "by imposing
moral condemnation and laying the groundwork for other sanctions.'A5
Moreover, an independent investigation can lead to compensation through
the judicial process by finding that a victim has suffered injury due to the
acts of individual or governmental entities.46
The third purpose of independent investigations is to facilitate na-
tional reconciliation. Both national reconciliation and individual rehabilita-
tion can be facilitated through an acknowledgment of "the suffering of vic-
fifteen hundred cases; and other information revealed the possibility of an additional forty-
five hundred or so victims.
43 Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission, supra note 29, at
380, 401.
44 Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,
16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597, 607 (1994).
45 Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission, supra note 29, at
375, 379 (referring to both commissions of inquiry and truth commissions as bodies that
investigate situations and submit reports). This article will not distinguish between these
different types of independent investigations, as a study would require a multifaceted discus-
sion into the specific characteristics of each mechanism, the way each mechanism is created,
the standards of procedural fairness that each mechanism employs to protects the rights of
victims and their families, witnesses, perpetrators, and others, and the involvement of these
individuals in the process and in subsequent criminal proceedings. See generally MARK
FREEMAN, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNEss (2006). Nonetheless, for the
present discussion, it is submitted that any form of international independent investigation
has the common goals of establishing the historical facts, classifying the crimes and identify-
ing those responsible. Moreover, its expeditious establishment would ensure that by the time
a tribunal is established, the results of the investigations carried out could be shared with the
prosecutor of the tribunal, as was the case with the 780 Commission.
46 Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission, supra note 29, at
390.
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tims and their families, helping to resolve uncertain cases, and allowing
victims to tell their story," which has been shown to help a population
"move beyond the pain of the past.' '47
The fourth purpose is to deter future violations and abuses. Further
violations can arguably be avoided if the independent investigations lead to
real reform by providing a "pressure point[] around which the civilian soci-
ety or the international community can lobby for change in the future. 'A8 As
is the case with most tribunals and courts created to bring an end to impu-
nity for international crimes, "[d]eterrence might be established through
effective, selective prosecutions to demonstrate that abuses are subject to
punishment and offenders subject to the rule of law.' 49 Such a court, on its
own, would fail to describe the totality of the crimes beyond the selective
prosecutions.
Fifth, an independent investigation allows for public observation
and gives the affected population access to the system of international
criminal justice. This is particularly evident in the case of truth commissions
that conduct public hearings and independent investigations that produce
interim and final reports. The South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, for example, gathered statements from approximately twenty-
four thousand victims of human rights abuse during its operation." In addi-
tion, the independent investigation in Lebanon, as will be discussed below,
has kept the public abreast of developments in its investigation into various
acts of terror in Lebanon. 1
V. MODERN EXAMPLES OF INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIONS AND THEIR
ROLE IN POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE
Since the 780 Commission, a number of international independent
investigations have been established. This section examines the UN-led
independent investigations that have been established prior to or in conjunc-
tion with anticipated international courts, such as those in Rwanda, Cambo-
41 Id. at 379.
48 Hayner, supra note 44, at 609.
49 Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission, supra note 29, at
380.
50 See Graeme Simpson, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, A Brief
Evaluation of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Some Lessons for So-
cieties in Transition, http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/paptrce2.htm (last visited May 25, 2007);
Paul van Zyl, Unfinished Business: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Is Contribu-
tion to Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 745 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 2002); Carsten Stahn et al., Participation of Victims in Pre-Trial Proceedings
of the ICC, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 219, 222 (2006) (discussing generally the contribution of
victims in court proceedings to reconciliation).
51 See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
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dia, Darfur, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Lebanon. Although none of these
models has yet replicated the scope of the 780 Commission's investigation,
a study of their shortcomings assists in developing a model for future inde-
pendent investigations.
A. The Rwandan Commission of Experts
Security Council Resolution 935 (1994) established a commission
of experts to investigate grave violations of international humanitarian law
and genocide committed in Rwanda, and to report its findings to the Secre-
tary-General (Rwandan Commission).52 In creating the Rwandan Commis-
sion, the UN Security Council repeated the process it had followed with
respect to the former Yugoslavia. However, the Rwandan Commission was
not as extensive as the 780 Commission, and it is clear that as a conse-
quence, the ICTR did not have the same head start as the ICTY.
The Rwandan Commission had a limited mandate of three months,
and was only established as a three-person commission as compared to the
much larger 780 Commission. Although it had an investigative mandate, it
spent only one week in the field, did not conduct any investigations, and did
not do any fact-finding. It has been suggested that its limited mandate and
the short duration of its presence in Rwanda prevented the Rwandan Com-
mission from effectively fulfilling its investigatory function.53 Moreover, it
had no means to investigate any specific allegations. Thus, its work was
based on reports made by other bodies and media, and published reports.
5 4
These flaws rendered the Rwandan Commission less effective than
the 780 Commission.5 As opposed to the 780 Commission, the Rwandan
Commission was more of a means to an end; the international community
had already decided to establish an ad hoc tribunal to prosecute those re-
sponsible for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. As such, the Rwandan
Commission did not have a commission of independent experts to gather
evidence to allow for an understanding of how the genocide happened, and
who stood in the way of preventing its occurrence.
B. Group of Experts for Cambodia
In June of 1997, Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh, then co-
prime ministers of Cambodia, submitted a letter to the UN requesting assis-
52 S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3400th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (July 1,
1994); Bassiouni, Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 29, at 46.
53 Bassiouni, Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 29, at 46.
54 Bassiouni, The UN and the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 34, at 43-44; Bas-
siouni, Versailles to Rwanda, supra note 29, at 46.
55 Bassiouni, Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions, supra note 34, at 42-
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tance in the establishment of a tribunal to try the former leaders of the
Khmer Rouge for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and viola-
tions of domestic Cambodian law. On December 12, 1997, the UN passed
General Assembly Resolution 52/135, which authorized the Secretary-
General to begin the process of bringing the perpetrators of the Khmer
Rouge atrocities to justice. The UN General Assembly requested that
the Secretary-General examine the request by the Cambodian authori-
ties for assistance, "including the possibility of the appointment.., of
a group of experts to evaluate the existing evidence and propose fur-
ther measures, as a means of bringing about national reconciliation,
strengthening democracy and addressing the issues of individual ac-
countability."56 In response to the General Assembly request, the Sec-
retary-General appointed the Group of Experts for Cambodia in 1998."7
The Group of Experts for Cambodia visited Cambodia for ten days
in November 1998 and conducted research in the various Cambodian ar-
58
chives and genocide museums. The Group of Experts then produced a
brief report, which did not evidence significant fact-finding 59 and its rec-
ommendations were not followed. The report only examined the feasibility
of prosecutorial justice mechanisms; namely an ad hoc tribunal, a hybrid
court, an international tribunal established by multilateral treaty and trials
conducted by third party states. The report provided a general sketch of the
crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge, but did not detail specific instances
of criminal activity, nor did it name individuals suspected of participating in
crimes. In addition, the mandate of the Group of Experts for Cambodia lim-
ited its investigations to crimes committed between 1975 and 1979, and it
could therefore only consider crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge. As
such, the work of the Group of Experts will not have the impact of the 780
56 G.A. Res. 52/135, 16, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 70th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/135 (Feb. 27, 1998).
57 Group of Experts, The Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Establish Pursuant
to General Assembly Resolution 52/135, 6, U.N. Doc. S/1999/231, A/53/850 (Mar. 16,
1999) [hereinafter Group of Experts for Cambodia Report]. The Group's mandate was "(a)
To evaluate the existing evidence with a view to determining the nature of the crimes com-
mitted by Khmer Rouge leaders in the years from 1975 to 1979; (b) to assess, after consulta-
tion with the Governments concerned, the feasibility of bringing Khmer Rouge leaders to
justice and their apprehension, detention and extradition or surrender to the criminal jurisdic-
tion established; (c) To explore options for bringing to justice Khmer Rouge leaders before
an international or national jurisdiction." Id. See generally Steven R. Ratner, The United
Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia, 93 Am. J. Int'l L. 948 (1999).
58 Group of Experts for Cambodia Report, supra note 57, 7.
59 See Bassiouni, Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions, supra note 34, at
44.
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Commission on the early work of the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers,
which, despite recent obstacles, is expected to begin trials shortly.60
C. International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
Like the 780 Commission and the Rwandan Commission, the
Commission of Inquiry in Darfur was created by the UN Security Council.
The Security Council, by Resolution 1564, directed the Secretary-General to
form a Commission of Inquiry to investigate reports of violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur (Darfur Commis-
sion).6' From November 2004 to January 2005, the Darfur Commission sent
investigative teams to Sudan to meet with local and national leaders, mem-
bers of the armed forces and police, rebel and tribal leaders, victims and
witnesses of violations, and non-governmental organizations.62 The report,
presented to the Secretary-General on January 25, 2005, submits that the
events in Darfur, although not constituting genocide, lead to the conclusion
that the government of Sudan was responsible for crimes against humanity
and war crimes on a mass scale.63
The Commission of Inquiry on Darfur was completed in ninety
days, but was comprehensive in scope.64 It assembled a detailed factual ac-
count of the crimes perpetrated by the parties to the armed conflict and it
clarified the legal principles applicable. In addition, it collected testimonial
and documentary evidence to identify fifty-one suspected perpetrators of
various crimes. 65 The Darfur Commission performed a far greater task than
preparing an overview of the conflict. It exemplified the ability of inde-
pendent investigations to ensure a thorough and systematic preliminary re-
view of the facts, fully reasoned legal analysis, and provide the basis for
potential prosecutions. The Darfur Commission guided the Security Council
in its referral of the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and will also serve as a tool in the ICC's initial work.66
60 See Editorial, The Killings Fields, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A20; Press Release,
Human Rights Watch, Cambodia: Government Interferes in Khmer Rouge Tribunal (Dec. 5,
2006), http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/12/05/cambod14752.htm.
61 S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5040th mtg., 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564
(Sept. 18, 2004); see Beth Van Schaack, Darfur and the Rhetoric of Genocide, 26 WHITIER
L. REv. 1101, 1108-09 (2005).
62 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the Secretary-General Pursu-
ant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, at 4 (Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinaf-
ter Darfur Report], available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com-inq_darfur.pdf; see
Van Schaack, supra note 61, at 1109.
63 See Van Schaack, supra note 61, at 1109; Darfur Report, supra note 61, at 5.
64 Alston, supra note 33, at 604.
65 Darfur Report, supra note 62, at 161; Alston, supra note 33, at 604.
66 Alston, supra note 33, at 607.
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D. Independent Investigations in Burundi
After the assassination of President Ndadaye on October 21, 1993, a
UN delegation was sent on a preparatory fact-finding mission with the man-
date to investigate the coup d'etat and the subsequent inter-ethnic massa-
cres. 67 The fact-finding mission suggested that the UN create an interna-
tional judicial commission or, alternatively, send an expert team to Burundi
to advise its national courts. The mission's recommendation resulted in the
creation of the UN International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi.
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1012 (1995), the Interna-
tional Commission of Inquiry for Burundi was mandated to establish facts
and to recommend measures for bringing those responsible for the coup
d'etat to justice.68 The Commission of Inquiry concluded that acts of geno-
cide did occur in Burundi in 1993 .69 However, its work was hampered by a
renewed outbreak of violence, a lack of adequate facilities, and the reluc-
tance of the government of Burundi to cooperate with investigators. 70 Con-
sequently, the commission did not produce a substantial report.71
It was not until several years later that the possibility of interna-
tional criminal justice was revived in Burundi. The 2000 Arusha Agree-
ment,72 which offered hope for ending a seven-year-long civil war between
the rebel and government forces, recommended the creation of an interna-
tional judicial commission of inquiry (Burundi Commission), in addition to
the establishment of a truth commission and a tribunal.73 The independent
investigation was requested by the government of Burundi on July 24, 2002,
and the Security Council responded on January 26, 2004, by requesting that
the Secretary-General dispatch a mission with the mandate to assess the
feasibility of an independent investigation.74
In its report, the mission assessed the feasibility of an independent
investigation and recommended that (1) a truth commission should "be set
up under existing national law with a mandate to establish the historical
67 Romana Schweiger, Late Justice for Burundi, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 653, 656 (2006).
68 See U.S. INST. OF PEACE, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY FOR BURUNDI: FINAL
REPORT (2004), available at http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/burundicoi/burundi_
coil996toc.html; Schweiger, supra note 67, at 656-57.
69 Schweiger, supra note 67, at 663.
70 International Commission of Inquiry for Burundi, Final Report, supra note 68, at 22, 29.
71 See Schweiger, supra note 67, at 657.
72 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, Aug. 28, 2000 [hereinafter
Arusha Agreement], available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/burnmdi/paburundi_
08282000_toc.html; see also Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Burundi, available
at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/africa/burundi.htmil.
73 Arusha Agreement, supra note 72, art. 6.
74 Schweiger, supra note 67, at 657-663.
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facts of the conflict, determine its causes and nature, classify the crimes
committed since independence in 1962, and identify those responsible," and
(2) an internationalized tribunal should be immediately created with "the
competence to prosecute those bearing the greatest responsibility for geno-
cide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 75 In effect, the report sug-
gested the creation of a hybrid truth commission which would assume the
work of a separate independent investigation and truth commission and
eventually assist a potential tribunal.76
Even though Security Council Resolution 1606 (2005) 77 requested
that the Secretary-General initiate negotiations with the government of Bu-
rundi and consultations with all Burundian parties concerned on how to
implement the creation of a mixed truth commission and a tribunal within
the country's court system, 8 presently it is not clear whether this tribunal
will be established. As such, it is of even greater importance that some form
of truth commission be established in Burundi.
E. Sierra Leone Independent Investigation and Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission
The establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)
and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) occurred in two dis-
tinct phases. The Lomd Peace Accords, signed in 1999, established the
TRC. Only after fighting resumed in 2000 did the Sierra Leonean govern-
ment request that the UN establish a court.79
UN Security Council Resolution 1315 authorized the Secretary-
General to negotiate the establishment of the SCSL.80 The Secretary-
General sent a fact-finding or "information-gathering" mission to Sierra
75 Press Release, Security Council Requests Secretary-General to Initiate Negotiations on
Burundi Truth Commission, Special Chamber; Unanimously Adopts Resolution 1606
(2005), U.N. Doc. SC/8418 (June 21, 2005) [hereinafter Burundi Press Release], available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8418.doc.htm.
76 See Schweiger, supra note 67, at 664-65.
77 S.C. Res. 1606, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5207th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES 1606 (June 20,
2005).
78 Burundi Press Release, supra note 75.
79 Annex to the Letter Dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra
Leone to the United Nations Addressed to the President of Security Council, at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/786 (Aug. 10, 2000).
'0 S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4162 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1305 (June 21,
2000).
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Leone to investigate the feasibility of establishing a court,8 ' and to examine
the government's requests and needs.
8 2
The Secretary-General's report, submitted in October of 2000, rec-
ommended the creation of a hybrid court seated in Sierra Leone.8 3 The ex-
perts involved in preparation of the report visited Sierra Leone for only
three days and mostly concentrated on the legal framework and constitutive
instruments establishing the SCSL, operational concerns, and held many
meetings with different segments of society. 84
The mandate of the SCSL is to prosecute those who bear the "great-
est responsibility" for war crimes and crimes against humanity stemming
from the ten year civil war in Sierra Leone.85 As such, the SCSL will have a
limited number of trials. The SCSL has issued indictments for thirteen sus-
pects, although two have died and one remains at large.86
Although the mandate of the SCSL is limited and the SCSL did not
benefit from a an investigative mechanism such as the 780 Commission, the
existence of the TRC's findings and work complements the prosecutions
being conducted at the SCSL, and furthers the historical record being estab-
lished at the SCSL. The TRC itself has produced a report including fifteen
hundred pages and seven thousand witness and victim statements.8 7 How-
ever, problems have arisen because of a failure to clearly delineate the rela-
tionship between the two bodies. One significant controversy, for example,
has been the question of the admissibility of statements made to the TRC in
trials in front of the SCSL.88 Although the SCSL did not benefit from exten-
sive independent investigation such as the 780 Commission, the combined
work of the SCSL and the TRC is portraying a complete picture of the con-
flict. Nonetheless, due to the conflicts between the two institutions, an ex-
81 The Secretary-General, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Mission in Sierra Leone, 9, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/751 (July
31, 2000) [hereinafter Fifth Report on Sierra Leone].
82 Id. 9.
83 See generally The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Estab-
lishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
'4 Id. 6-7.
85 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on Estab-
lishing a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 12, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138.
86 The Secretary-General, Special Court for Sierra Leone Completion Strategy, 7-8,
delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2005/350,
A/59/816 (May 26, 2005).
87 See generally The Final Report of the Truth & Reconciliation Commission of Sierra
Leone (Oct. 5, 2004), http://www.trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/index.shtml.
88 See, e.g., Chandra Lekha Sriram, Wrong-Sizing International Justice? The Hybrid Tri-
bunal in Sierra Leone, 29 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 472, 477-80 (2006).
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tensive international independent investigation working in conjunction with
the SCSL would have been desirable.
F. Lebanon International Independent Investigation Commission
On February 14, 2005, a terrorist attack in Beirut killed former
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and twenty-two other people. The president of
the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General follow the inves-
tigation in Lebanon and report on the circumstances, causes and conse-
quences of the bombing. 89 The Secretary-General's report found that the
Lebanese investigation was not thorough, nor was it consistent with interna-
tional standards. It also determined that the Lebanese investigation lacked
the support of the population necessary for the acceptance of its results. The
report concluded that an international investigatory commission was needed
to establish the circumstances surrounding the bombing. 90
Accordingly, in Resolution 1595 the Security Council created an In-
ternational Independent Investigation Commission to assist the Lebanese
authorities in their investigation of the terrorist act and help to identify its
perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices (Hariri Commission).9'
The Hariri Commission and the Lebanese government signed a Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MOU) outlining the modalities of cooperation be-
tween the two parties.92 Significantly, the MOU stated that "the Government
of Lebanon shall guarantee that the Commission is free from interference in
the conduct of its investigation, and is provided with all necessary assis-
tance to fulfil its mandate. 93 The Hariri Commission was created as a dif-
ferent form of investigation; as a prosecutorial investigation it would deter-
mine its own procedures, collect evidence, both documentary and physical,
89 Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/4 (Feb. 15,
2005).
90 Fact-Finding Mission to Lebanon, Report Inquiring into the Causes, Circumstances and
Consequences of the Assassination of Former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/203 (Mar. 24, 2005). On September 25, the most recent
report of Commissioner Serge Brammertz was delivered. International Independent Investi-
gation Commission, Fifth Report of the Commission Established Pursuant to Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005) and 1644 (2005), U.N. Doc. S/2006/760 (Sept. 25,
2006). The Commission's mandate has been extended through June of 2007. S.C. Res. 1686,
U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5461st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES1686 (June 15, 2006).
9' S.C. Res. 1595, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5160th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1595 (Apr. 7,
2005).
92 Press Release, Security Council, Commission Investigating Hariri Killing Fully Opera-
tional, Secretary-General Informs Security Council, U.N. Doc. SC/8414 (June 16, 2005),
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsm9937.doc.htm.
93 The Secretary-General, Report of the International Independent Investigation Commis-
sion Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1595, 1 5, delivered to the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/662 (Oct. 20, 2005).
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meet and interview any civilians or officials it deemed necessary and have
unrestricted access to all premises throughout the Lebanese territory, taking
into account Lebanese law and judicial procedures. The Lebanese authori-
ties, for their part, were to assist the Hariri Commission in its work by pro-
viding all documentary and material evidence in their possession and by
locating witnesses as requested by the Hariri Commission.
The Hariri Commission is also mandated to offer technical assis-
tance in fifteen other terrorist attacks which occurred in Lebanon from Oc-
tober 2004. The scope of the investigation was expanded on November 22,
2006, following the assassination of Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel. On
the same day, the UN Security Council approved the establishment of a
tribunal to prosecute the suspected killers of Hariri and the other terrorist
attacks, and it is expected that the proposed tribunal will also prosecute the
killing of Gemayel.94 At the time of writing, the Lebanese government had
yet to give its anticipated final approval to the establishment of the tribunal,
which would follow the model of the hybrid international tribunals, such as
the SCSL, but be located outside of Lebanon.95 The Hariri Commission will
hopefully have a similar impact on the early work of this tribunal as the 780
Commission exerted on the ICTY. Moreover, this relationship will hope-
fully provide a model for future post-conflict and criminal justice mecha-
nisms.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION IN
IRAQ
Creating an international or internationalized tribunal with UN sup-
port in Iraq would have been a desirable option according to many of the
experts at the "Lessons from the Saddam Trial" symposium and experts
meeting. Unfortunately, negotiations between the UN, the Iraqi government,
and other interested parties never materialized due to a few fundamental
differences. The UN has noted that serious doubts exist regarding the capa-
bility of the IHT to meet relevant international standards. Specifically, the
Secretary-General recently stated that UN officials should not be directly
involved in lending assistance to any court or tribunal that is empowered to
94 Associated Press, Security Council Agrees to Lebanon's Request for U.N. Assistance in
Gemayel Assassination Investigation, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 22, 2006, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/11/22/news/UNGEN UN LebanonGemayel.php.
95 At the time of publication of this article, the Security Council authorized the formation
of an international tribunal. See S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. SCOR, 62nd Sess., 5685th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). It should be noted that another investigation at the request
of the UN Human Rights Council is being conducted to investigate the Israel-Lebanon con-
flict that began in July 2006. See UN Human Rights Council Names Experts to Probe Israeli
Civilian Killings in Lebanon, UN NEWS CENTRE, Sept. 1, 2006, http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewsID- 19694&Cr&Crl/Leban.
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impose the death penalty.96 The UN indicated its unwillingness to assist in
the establishment of the IHT in October of 2004, when it showed caution in
granting a request to authorize ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte's atten-
dance at a training conference for the judges and prosecutors of the IHT.
The official explanation provided was that accepting such invitations would
divert officials from performing their duties at the ICTY when it is working
to meet target dates for its completion strategy.97 Even though it appears
that UN presence was not a possibility, a separate independent investigation
under the auspices of the UN would not have implicated the UN in the im-
position of the death penalty. Such an independent investigation would have
been a valuable contribution to the strategies for post-conflict justice in Iraq,
especially with the future of the IHT now in doubt.
An international investigation to document the crimes of the Ba'ath
regime is necessary. The establishment of both an independent investigation
and a court to try Saddam Hussein and his cohorts is not a new idea.98 For
example, in 1991, one expert has noted that the United States started to col-
lect documents that were scanned and computerized by the Department of
Defense, and "engaged in large-scale interrogation of Iraqi prisoners of war
in Saudi Arabia for use in future prosecutions." 99 Several years ago, there
were discussions within Office of the Legal Adviser in the State Department
to establish an international commission to investigate Iraqi war crimes
committed during the Persian Gulf War.'00 In 1994, the Clinton administra-
tion began consultations with Security Council members to establish a
commission to investigate Iraqi regime's domestic crimes and war crimes
against Iran and Kuwait, and there were recommendations to expand the
investigation to the political violence committed by the Ba'ath regime since
1968, modelled on the 780 Commission.10' However, none of these mecha-
nisms ever materialized.
More recently, noted scholars have called for a commission to in-
vestigate and document the political violence committed in Iraq between
1968 and 2003, and provide an objective, formal, and official account of
that violence, detailing specific violations of human rights and humanitarian
law as well as general patterns of repression.10 2 As was the case with the
96 Fifth Report on Sierra Leone, supra note 81, 10; Press Release, Security Council
Briefed on Violence, Drift in Middle East (Oct. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/hilites/hilites-arch-view.asp?HighlD=149.
97 Id.
98 See generally David Scheffer, What if a Different US. Strategy Had Built a Different
Court for Iraq, in SADDAM ON TRIAL, supra note 7, at 98.
99 Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq, supra note 6, at 339.
100 See Scharf, Bassiouni and the 780 Commission, supra note 39, at 8.
101 Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq, supra note 6, at 339.
102 Id. at 386.
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780 Commission, the independent investigation would complete its work by
issuing a final report providing a detailed account of past violence and vio-
lations and making a series of specific policy recommendations for future
dissemination and use in the Iraqi educational system and the Arab world.
As such, the reports could serve as a permanent reference for future genera-
tions.103
Although the IHT is the only formal institution created to document
the atrocities of the Saddam Hussein regime, the IHT does have an investi-
gative arm. This investigative arm was given seventy five million dollars in
funding by the Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator. It is also ex-
tensively staffed by United States Department of Justice prosecutors and
investigators, who are in Iraq to gather evidence that is presented to the in-
vestigative judge of the IHT and to organize the IHT and give on-the-job
training to its judges and prosecutors. 104 In addition, the IHT has also con-
ducted its own investigations. 
5
Despite these steps, it is now clear that an independent investigation
could have assisted in furthering the overall goals of the IHT. The inde-
pendent investigation could have cooperated with the Iraqi government, the
creator of the IHT, in a similar power-sharing model to that of the Interna-
tional Independent Investigation Commission in Lebanon. 10 6 Further, creat-
ing an independent investigation with a strong mandate and broad interna-
tional support reduces the problem of under-funding 10 7 and ensures the
transparency required for credible proceedings. 10 8 Moreover, independent
investigations would document all findings and interviews and prepare a
report that is more comprehensive than the work of the IHT and the De-
partment of Justice. As we have learned from the modern independent in-
vestigations, they can be created in a complementary manner and are bene-
ficial even if judicial mechanisms do not materialize.
Unfortunately, the perhaps unprecedented political sensitivity sur-
rounding the establishment of the RIT meant that the opportunity for a thor-
ough, independent investigation as a precursor to the trials of the IHT was
lost. However, the commencement of trials at the IHT, and even the execu-
tion of Saddam Hussein, do not render an independent investigation in Iraq
futile. As has been elaborated above, a properly-mandated investigation
103 Id.
104 See Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, US. Team Is Sent to Develop Case in Hussein
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at A1; Bassiouni, supra note 6, at 345-47.
105 See Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq, supra note 6, at 346-47 (explaining
American involvement in the Iraqi Special Tribunal).
106 See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
107 See Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission, supra note 29,
at 376.
108 Id.
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could still assist in furthering the goals of international criminal justice, by
recording and documenting the multitude of crimes outlined in Part I, par-
ticularly those falling outside the scope of the completed and anticipated
IHT trials. Even at this late stage when a tribunal is already operational,
investigations can still serve an important purpose in a post-conflict envi-
ronment. This is illustrated by the fact that numerous independent missions
currently are operating in Iraq with a view to creating a more complete his-
torical record of the Ba'ath regime's rule, such as the oral history that Pro-
fessor M. Cherif Bassiouni is conducting by interviewing twenty-seven
hundred victims in Iraq.'0 9 While it is currently unclear whether a compre-
hensive independent investigation into the crimes committed in Iraq is
likely in the near future, it is certain that the recent uncertainty and criticism
of the IHT has highlighted the importance of the 780 Commission and the
work of other independent investigations as a model to further post-conflict
justice.
109 See Symposium, Lessons from the Saddam Trial, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. (2007).
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